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Semiconductors were a “global” industry long before the term was fashion- 
able. Many U.S. semiconductor  firms aggressively invested abroad prior to be- 
ing well established in their home market. The rationale and location of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in semiconductors largely fit conventional theories of 
foreign investment: at different points in time, firms located overseas to take 
advantage of low labor costs, to overcome tariff barriers, to appropriate their 
intangible assets (intellectual property), and to reduce transaction costs and 
arbitrage costs of capital differences. However, the patterns of investment have 
changed dramatically over the last two decades. This raises a number of inter- 
esting theoretical issues. 
I will argue that FDI in semiconductors can be roughly grouped into three 
waves. During the first wave, in the  1960s and  1970s, the world leaders in 
semiconductors (largely U.S. firms) invested heavily overseas in assembly and 
test facilities which exploited locational advantages (low labor costs in South- 
east Asia), and they  only invested in fabrication facilities that jumped tariff 
barriers (in Europe). The Asian investment was complementary to trade; the 
European investment was largely trade substituting. For the most part, inward 
FDI did not occur in Japan because of strict capital controls. 
During a second wave, in the mid-l970s, FDI moved beyond greenfield in- 
vestment in the final stage of  manufacturing to mergers and acquisitions of 
entire firms; European firms, in particular, expanded their presence in the U.S. 
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market by buying U.S. companies. Acquisitions of non-start-up  semiconduc- 
tor companies in this second wave appear to have ended, at least temporarily, 
when political intervention prevented Japan’s Fujitsu from buying a U.S .-based 
firm,  Fairchild  Semiconductor, which  was  owned  by  a  French  company, 
Schlumberger, based in the Netherlands Antilles. 
A third wave  of  FDI started in the late 1980s and has continued into the 
early 1990s. This wave is characterized by significant FDI in greenfield front- 
end fabrication facilities, primarily by U.S. firms in Europe and Japanese firms 
in both the United States and Europe. With a few exceptions, most notably 
IBM and Texas Instruments (TI), core Research and Development activities 
on semiconductors have remained in the home base throughout the history of 
the industry. 
The evolution of  investment in these waves can be largely accounted for by 
political changes (e.g., the U.S.-Japanese Semiconductor Trade Agreement of 
1986 and Europe’s 1992 program) and changes in technology (i.e., declining 
labor intensity and rising scale economies). But the dynamics of change pre- 
sent some surprising puzzles. First, there has been stickiness to foreign invest- 
ment in semiconductors. Despite radical changes in the economics of  the in- 
dustry, which  largely negate the  advantages of  locating in low-labor  cost 
countries, many historical investments in Southeast Asia have remained intact 
and been expanded. Second, there appears to be a lack of  agglomeration in 
the new greenfield investments. While some theories might suggest that local 
externalities would produce investment in  clusters (Krugman 1991; Porter 
1990), significant portions of the greenfield ED1 in the late 1980s and early 
1990s have  been widely dispersed in the United States and Europe. Third, 
there continue to be dramatic asymmetries between the style of investments by 
nonlocal firms in Japan and FDI in Europe and the United States. FDI in Japan 
is scarce, and the little investment which has occurred has been in the form of 
joint ventures, even though restrictions on FDI have been formally eliminated. 
Outside of Japan, by  contrast, most Japanese and U.S. firms invest in wholly 
owned greenfield facilities outside of their home base. 
The methodology for this paper relies heavily on relatively soft data and 
interviews. Unfortunately, systematic evidence on FDI in semiconductors is 
difficult to obtain: neither firms nor governments publish precise data on in- 
vestment expenditures, overseas employment, or revenues. Even capacity num- 
bers, which some firms disclose and which might be considered proxies for 
production, are unreliable because of variations in semiconductor yields. My 
primary source of data is from the industry, particularly Dataquest, which pub- 
lishes plant locations, estimates of offshore production, and trade statistics. In 
addition, I have relied on interviews with managers in leading semiconductor 
firms in the United States, Japan, and Europe. The analysis is also confined 
largely to the merchant market for semiconductors and focuses primarily on 
the higher-technology, higher-growth segment of integrated circuits. 199  Foreign Direct Investment in Semiconductors 
7.1.1  The Economics of Semiconductors-Past  and Present 
It is well known that semiconductors have some unusual economic charac- 
teristics. The production of semiconductors and, more specifically, integrated 
circuits (ICs) benefited more than any other product in industrial history from 
an amazingly steep learning curve. In 1964, a chip containing about sixty-four 
components was priced at around $32. By 1971, the price of a chip containing 
over a thousand components was about $1 (Yoffie 1987a; Borms  1988). Be- 
tween 1974 and 1988, there was a 635-fold reduction in memory prices per bit 
(Semiconductor Industry Association 1992). The rule of thumb in the industry 
was that costs generally fell 30 percent to 40 percent with every doubling in 
volume. Such steep learning economies occurred because semiconductor man- 
ufacturing routinely yielded more defective than sound chips. For complex 
new products, yields as low as 25 percent were quite common, while mature 
products might yield 90 percent. Although documentation is weak, producers 
also believed that there were intergenerational externalities: learning gained 
from  making  1-Mb DRAMS, for  instance, could  be  transferred  to  4-Mb 
DRAMS. 
In  addition to learning economies, the semiconductor industry has been 
characterized by very high and growing economies of scale in front-end fabri- 
cation (fab) combined with extraordinary levels of research and development 
(R&D). In 1970, a minimum efficient scale plant required about $30 million 
in capital investment, and the output of that plant needed to generate roughly 
3 percent of world sales to break even. By 1992, state-of-the-art plants cost an 
average of  $650 million but could range from $200 million to as much as $1 
billion; the cost varied with the complexity of the product and the desired vol- 
ume. While overall world market share was no longer relevant, estimates sug- 
gested that a manufacturer would need $1.25 billion in annual revenue and 
10-20  percent world market share within a particular segment to justify even 
a small fab.‘ 
Also, unlike large, lumpy investments in other industries, which had long 
useful lives, physical plants became obsolete in only three to five years in the 
semiconductor business. There were several consequences of  this economic 
feature. First, firms had to make significant ongoing capital expenditures.2  Sec- 
ond, investments were generally sunk, with little or no after-market value. And 
a closely related third, the relatively thin market for capacity limited the op- 
tions for FDI. Few firms wanted to buy competitors’ fabs because of the rapid 
aging of the facility, plus variations in manufacturing processes between firms 
limited the general utility of any given firm’s investment. 
1.  Interview with semiconductor executives. 
2.  While capital expenditures averaged only 10 percent of sales in 1990, they averaged over 30 
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Beyond the economies of scale in manufacturing, semiconductors were also 
one of the most R&D-intensive industries, with R&D expenditures averaging 
more than twice the U.S. manufacturing average. In 1990, R&D was 12.8 per- 
cent of U.S.  semiconductor revenues. Semiconductor technology also had a 
peculiar problem of being difficult to appropriate. Especially in the U.S. Sili- 
con Valley, personnel tended to be highly mobile, and it was common for ven- 
ture capital firms to lure away promising engineers from established compa- 
nies. Most of the start-ups in Silicon Valley came from Fairchild and later Intel. 
The “leakiness” of technology and the significant infrastructure developed in 
Silicon Valley made it an attractive place for a new entrant to establish a busi- 
ness in the 1960s through the 1980s. At the same time, there were strong econ- 
omies of agglomeration in R&D: very close coordination and communication 
among R&D facilities was desirable. 
The cost structure of  semiconductor firms has evolved over time. Variable 
costs, always small, have declined over the last three decades. The basic inputs 
into semiconductor production are sand (silicon) and electricity. Distribution 
and transportation costs are tiny (1-2  percent). By 1992, freight costs ranged 
from two-three  cents for a commodity product packaged in plastic to ten cents 
for larger chips packaged in ceramic. With insignificant transportation costs, it 
was relatively simple in the 1960s and 1970s to physically separate the stages 
of production-especially  fabrication versus assembly and test. By the 1980s, 
however, capital investment in automation dramatically reduced variable labor 
costs, virtually eliminating the cost penalty of colocating all stages of produc- 
tion in a high-wage location. A volume assembly facility in 1992 cost approxi- 
mately $125 million-$130  million for the building (20 percent) and equipment 
(80 percent). One estimate suggested that direct labor per chip in 1992 was 
about ten-twenty  cents in  Southeast Asia  versus twelve-fifty  cents in  the 
United States, depending largely on the product ~omplexity.~ 
7.2  First Wave of FDI: Assembly and Test in Southeast 
Asia and Europe 
The first wave  of FDI  in semiconductors was documented thoroughly by 
Kenneth Flamm (Flamm and Grunwald 1985). To summarize Flamm’s argu- 
ment, the first surge in foreign investment came in the 1960s from the pioneers 
in the industry, U.S. firms. The shift to offshore assembly operations became 
especially important between 1964 and 1972, driven by the aggressive moves 
of firms in the increasingly competitive industry to compete on cost. The natu- 
ral division of production among wafer fabrication, assembly, and testing al- 
3.  Interview with industry executive. Since the final selling price of these chips could vary from 
$1 to $500, it is difficult to calculate direct labor as a percentage of  sales. The assembly of the 
simple, low-priced memory chips, however, was much more automated. In addition, the added 
one-three  cents in direct labor costs for simple chips in the United States could be offset by  lower 
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lowed the assembly stage of  production to be located at a different facility 
from fabrication without any significant impact on learning economies. And 
the assembly stage required relatively low-skilled labor that was  available 
abroad at a substantial wage discount (as much as 90 percent), yielding up to 
a 50 percent reduction in total manufacturing costs. The difference in the final 
price of a chip could be as much as $1.50, versus $3.00 for memory products 
in the mid-1970s. Not for another decade could a high percentage of this labor 
cost be automated out of assembly. 
The policies of  both the United States and several newly industrializing 
countries also supported the offshore assembly strategy. Under items 807 and 
806.3 of the U.S. Tariff Schedules as amended in 1963, imported articles as- 
sembled in whole or in part of U.S.-fabricated components became dutiable 
only to the extent of  the value added abroad. This meant a substantial tariff 
break on the offshore assembly of chips. And beginning in 1967, the govern- 
ments of Mexico, Taiwan, Singapore,  Malaysia, and Korea established “export 
platforms” to encourage direct foreign investment. These platforms offered a 
wide variety of  inducements to such investment, including tax-free exports, 
import tax reductions, and tax holidays. By  1974, the U.S.-based producers 
had established 136 operations overseas: 33 fabrication; 103 assembly, 69 of 
which were in developing countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia (see 
table 7.1). By 1978, more than 80 percent of the semiconductors shipped in the 
United States were assembled and tested overseas, mainly in these countries. 
The second type of  foreign  direct investment-front-end  fabrication to 
serve a local market-occurred  mainly in Europe, where high tariff rates (17 
Table 7.1  Overseas Operations of U.S.-based Semiconductor  Companies, 1974 






























































Source: Finan (1975,56-58). 202  David B. Yoffie 
percent of  value), preferential procurement procedures, and pressure by  the 
European governments (especially British and French) encouraged such in- 
vestment to serve growing European markets. The first major period of invest- 
ment in Europe occurred between 1969 and 1974, by which time 46 affiliates 
(1  8 engaged in complete manufacturing operations, including fabrication and 
assembly) had been established (Flamm 1990). In the absence of trade barriers, 
exports would have been the preferred mechanism for serving the European 
Economic  Community  market. The  economies  of  scale in  manufacturing 
and  the  added logistics costs of  transferring designs and  making the fabs 
"work" in Europe could only be justified economically if  exporting was im- 
possible.  The  least  attractive  option  was  to  license  technology  to  local 
firms. While cross-licensing was very common if two companies had patents 
that were mutually valuable, one-way licenses for money were less desirable 
because it was  extremely difficult  to appropriate adequate value from the 
technology. 
Tariffs, quotas, and other forms of border protection also encouraged U.S. 
companies to consider foreign direct investment to serve the Japanese market. 
But the Japanese actively restricted such investment (in contrast to the Europe- 
ans, who actively encouraged it). The Japanese strategy was avowedly one of 
import substitution through the creation and promotion of indigenous suppli- 
ers, while the European strategy was one of import substitution, at least in part, 
through substituting the local production of U.S. companies for imports from 
them. Japan also restricted foreign purchases of equity in Japanese firms. High 
tariffs, restrictive quotas, and approval registration requirements were used to 
control imports. Approval was also required for all patent and technical assis- 
tance licensing agreements. As a result of controls on the acquisition of foreign 
technology, the Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI) acted as a 
monopsonist buyer of such technology and also controlled its diffusion among 
Japanese firms. These tight border controls held the U.S. share of the Japanese 
semiconductor market substantially below what it was in the rest of the world. 
By 1975, for example, U.S.  firms had 98 percent of the U.S. market, 78 percent 
of the European market, and only 20 percent of the Japanese market. 
The requirements posed by the Japanese government for investment were so 
unattractive that few firms chose to exercise this option:  Most leading U.S. 
firms chose the only avenue open to earn a return from the Japanese market: 
one-way licenses of technology. Through most of  the  1970s, licensing fees 
amounted to almost 10 percent of Japanese sales (Braun and Macdonald 1982, 
155). Only Texas Instruments (TI), by  refusing to license its key  integrated 
circuit patents to Japanese firms and by petitioning the U.S. government for 
trade protection based on patent infringement by  the Japanese, was  able to 
4.  Even after direct controls were abolished in 1978, non-Japanese firms found it difficult to 
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Table 7.2  U.S. Participation in Foreign Semiconductor  Markets 
Semiconductor  Percentage  Cumulative Number of 
consumption in France,  supplied by  U.S. Factories in These 
and Japan, Uncorrected  from the 
Britain, W.  Germany  Direct Exports  Countries 
Values ($ millions)  United States  Assembly  Fabricating 
1960  $134  11%  5  4 
1961  151  15  6  4 
1962  174  16  6  4 
1963  208  17  7  5 
1964  248  16  8  5 
1965  323  23  8  6 
1966  349  27  10  7 
1967  390  32  11  7 
1968  490  30  13  8 
1969  660  37  24  15 
1970  840  30  29  16 
1971  875  25  30  18 
1972  1,284  18  34  18 
Source: Finan (1975, 120). 
Note: Virtually 100 percent of U.S. supply to Japan was serviced by direct exports until 1970. And 
even TI’s one local fab in Japan, jointly owned by  Sony, did not have a material impaction these 
numbers through 1972. 
extract permission from the Japanese government to establish a wholly owned 
manufacturing subsidiary in Japan in 1968.5 
The implications this first wave of FDI had for international trade were un- 
surprising. Most FDI during this period was complementary to U.S. exports. 
Through the late  1970s, an estimated 80 percent of  the fabrication by  U.S. 
firms was still done in the United States; 20 percent was done abroad, mainly 
in Europe. The reverse numbers applied in assembly: about 80 percent of as- 
sembly by U.S. firms was performed abroad and only 20 percent at home. FDI 
in Europe, however, appeared to be largely a substitute for trade, at least during 
this early period. Direct U.S. exports to Europe declined between the late 
1960s and the early 1970s, as the number of  fabs more than doubled over a 
four-year period (see table 7.2). The combination of significant investment in 
assembly operations in Southeast Asia and investment in fabs in Europe re- 
duced U.S. net export earnings, producing U.S. trade deficits as early as 1971 
(table 7.3). Most U.S. imports until the late 1970s were assembled products 
5. Initially, TI  was only allowed to establish a 50-50  joint venture with Sony in 1968. Four 
years later, Sony sold out to TI. MITI finally agreed to TI’s request for a wholly owned subsidiary 
only after TI threatened any Japanese exports of consumer electronics using TI’s technology with 
an immediate patent infringement lawsuit. For more on the history of joint ventures in the semi- 
conductor industry, see Steinmueller (1987). 204  David B. Yoffie 
Table 7.3  Total U.S. Semiconductor lkade ($ millions) 
Exports  Imports 
Transistors,  Transistors, 
Integrated  Diodes, and  Integrated  Diodes, and 
Total  Circuits  Rectifiers  Other*  Total  Circuits  Non-Rectifiers  Other* 
1966  $  130.4 
1967  152.4 
1968  204.5 
1969  345.7 
1970  416.9 
1971  370.5 
1972  469.6 
1973  848.6 
1974  1,247.5 
1975  1,037 
1976  1,385.9 
1977  1,490.5 
1978  1,521.4 
1979  2,075.1 
1980  2,782.3 
1981  2,832.7 
1982  3,058.9 
1983  3,673.5 
1984  4,651.5 
1985  3,693.1 
1986  4,185.4 
1987  6,229 
1988  8,035.4 
1989  9,530.6 
1990  10,709.6 














































$  30.5  $  44.6 
44.1  46.5 
78.8  76.6 
134.7  111.2 
170.9  167.7 
179.4  187 
240.1  328.8 
435.1  610.5 
718.4  953.5 
663.3  802 
945.2  1,098 
1,071.8  1,403.2 
964.1  1,827.4 
1,334.1  2,587.7 
1,853.6  3,395.6 
1,977  3,645.5 
2,140.8  4,397 
2,549.9  5,330.1 
3,141.4  8,284.2 
2,429.4  6,369.7 
2,898.5  6,685.7 
4,474.9  8,561.9 
5,278.5  12,089.8 
12,301.6 
12,143.5 

































































Sources;  1966-72:  U.S. Department of  Commerce Publications #ES-2:  15. 1973-76:  U.S.  Departmen 
of Commerce Publications #ES-2: 17. 1977-82:  U.S. Department of Commerce Publications #ES-2: 19 
1983-86:  U.S. Department of Commerce Publications #ES-2:20.  1987-88:  compiled from U.S. Depart- 
ment of Commerce Publications #FT-246. 1989-90: Compiled from U.S. Department of Commerce statis. 
tics (breakdowns for 1989-90  were not available due to a change in classification from SIC to a harmo- 
nized system). 
*Other semiconductor devices. 
from U.S. affiliates located in the newly industrializing countries (NICs). U.S. 
exports of unfinished circuits were primarily to five Southeast Asian assembly 
locations for final assembly and packaging. These products were then either 
reexported to the United States or to Japan and Europe. 
The one other area where FDI might have been trade substituting was TI’s 
fab investments in Japan. TI’s strategy was to service the Japanese market from 
its facilities in Japan. By the 1980s, even TI had become a net exporter from 205  Foreign Direct Investment in Semiconductors 
Japan, importing virtually nothing from the United States.6 While its initial 
investment might have  been considered a complement to trade (since MITI 
strictly limited TI’S imports), TI did not switch production back to the United 
States when imports restrictions were liberalized in the mid- 1970s. 
7.3  Second Wave: European Acquisitions of U.S. Firms 
From the mid-1970s through the mid-l980s, the structure of the semicon- 
ductor industry changed, and so did the patterns of direct investment. The most 
obvious structural shift was the rise of Japanese competitors, accompanied by 
the virtual collapse of  Europe and the relative decline of  U.S. firms. Here 
again, the story is well known and need not be repeated in this paper. But 
accompanying this structural shift in competitive position was a change in in- 
vestment patterns. FDI in assembly facilities in Southeast Asia continued and 
indeed expanded as Japanese firms also began investing in assembly operations 
in the region. There was also further incremental U.S. investment in fab capac- 
ity and design centers in Europe and I~rael.~  However, the most notable trend 
in FDI during this period was outright acquisitions or taking substantial owner- 
ship positions in leading U.S. firms. 
A list of  the major corporate acquisitions or investments can be found in 
table 7.4. Most of the explanations for these investments fit into the school of 
industrial organization motivations for FDI rather than the variety of  macro- 
explanations associated with locational advantages, tax policies, cost of capi- 
tal, protectionism, and so on. It is hard to attribute the trend to macroeconom- 
ics or macropolicies, because the pattern of  acquiring U.S.  semiconductor 
companies was so ubiquitous: the investors were large U.S. companies as well 
as non-U.S. firms based in a variety of locations in Europe, North America, 
and Asia. Although a few of the acquisitions could be traced to firms trying to 
diversify their existing business portfolio, such as Exxon’s purchase of Zilog 
and Schlumberger’s purchase of  Fairchild, most of the acquiring firms were 
already in some part of the electronics business. 
Until the end of the 1970s, small U.S. firms were the clear leaders in product 
and process technology. Many of these companies were willing recipients of 
foreign (or domestic) capital because of the rising capital and R&D expendi- 
6. Interview with TI executives, 1986. 
7.  Israel was unusual because it was probably the only country where U.S. firms, such as Mo- 
torola and Intel, invested in R&D facilities that served the global market. The design centers in 
Israel, unlike most Japanese design centers in the United States or U.S. design centers in Europe 
and Japan, were not exclusively focused on local adaptation of products. ’Iko firms, National 
Semiconductor and Intel, also invested in fabs in Israel. Israel was an attractive location because 
the government offered tax relief and some subsidies in addition to an abundant supply of highly 
qualified engineers and preferential tariff treatment for Israeli exports to Europe. Intel’s decision 
to invest in a design center and then a fab was largely a consequence of a senior, highly valued 
Intel manager who wanted to return home. Table 7.4  Selected Corporate Investments in U.S. Semiconductor Companies, 19751991 
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Source: The Wall Street Journal (various issues); New York Zlmes (various issues). 208  David B. Yoffie 
tures required in the industry. While venture capital was plentiful for most 
of this period for start-up companies, intense Japanese competition beginning 
around 1976 limited access to debt and equity markets for small firms that 
wanted to expand their fab or assembly operations. Prevailing wisdom at the 
time was that a large, diversified parent corporation could solve the inherent 
cyclicality problems of the business. 
If  small U.S. firms were willing to be acquired, why did large European, 
some large Japanese, and even South Korean companies want to buy?’ The 
answer has two parts. First, several of the acquired companies had significant 
technologies, patents, or cross-licenses. Even for firms not in the merchant 
semiconductor market, integrated circuit technology was perceived to be criti- 
cal for downstream applications. There was a variety of externalities associated 
with ICs. As chips became more highly integrated, growing in capacity and 
complexity, they took on the characteristics of  entire systems. To appropriate 
the value of the system, most major computer, telecommunications, and con- 
sumer electronics companies in the world believed that they would have  to 
make semiconductors. Companies such as IBM, DEC, Hewlett-Packard, Sie- 
mens, and Philips, as well as all of the large Japanese electronics companies, 
integrated backward in the 1960s. In fact, several of these companies, particu- 
larly IBM and DEC, gained significant competitive advantages from their abil- 
ity to design and make custom logic chips that were proprietary. 
A second rationale behind these acquisitions was to learn the “secret” of 
U.S. success in semiconductors. For European firms in particular, partly be- 
cause they had failed to become significant players on their own, acquiring or 
investing in small U.S.  companies was attractive. Europe was a relatively small 
and fragmented market for semiconductors, compared to the United States, in 
the early 1970s. Dominated by national champions, none of the large European 
semiconductor manufacturers had established itself in a position of  global 
leadership. By investing in U.S. companies, many of which had at least one 
generation of  successful products, these European firms hoped to appropriate 
some of the externalities of being located in the leading market for innovations 
in semiconductors. Silicon Valley  in California was an especially attractive 
region because of the leakiness in technology and mobility of personnel. As 
one European scholar reported from an interview with European semiconduc- 
tor executives, 
Such a firm [the European acquisition] would rapidly discover what ingredi- 
ents contributed most to success in the industry, would act as a training 
ground for non-American personnel and would be able to funnel informa- 
tion about processes and techniques to the parent firm or home country with 
8.  Korea’s Samsung bought 22.1 percent of Micron Technology, a DRAM manufacturer, for $5 
million in  1986. This particular horiozntal investment seemed to be targeted  at getting across 
to DRAM patents and technology. Also in  1986, Daewoo bought controlling interest in a small 
semiconductor firm,  Zymos, in a bid to enter semiconductors (“Overseas investments” 1991). 209  Foreign Direct Investment in Semiconductors 
the minimum delay and the maximum effectiveness. (Braun and Macdonald 
None of  the acquisitions, however, proved to be profitable for foreign (or 
even domestic) acquirers. Without exception, the European acquisitions were 
unsuccessful. Siemens, unable to gain leverage in its investment in Advanced 
Micro Devices, divested its holdings in  1991; American Microsystems, partly 
owned by Germany’s Robert Bosch, no longer exists; Interdesign was absorbed 
by  Ferranti, which remained a minor player in  semiconductors; and Inmos 
dropped in market share to obscure levels. In the early 1980s, France’s Thom- 
son Semiconductor merged with Italy’s SGS, which in turn bought Mostek 
from ITT. In the mid-l970s,  Mostek was a significant DRAM supplier. By the 
late 1980s, Mostek facilities and product lines had virtually disappeared. 
But the greatest failure of them all was Fairchild Camera, one of  the pio- 
neers of U.S. semiconductors. From the outset, Fairchild proved to be a cash 
drain for its parent, Schlumberger. Schlumberger entered a bidding war with a 
U.S. firm, Gould, for Fairchild in 1979. As a white knight, it paid $425 million 
in cash, which included $253 million in goodwill. Over the next seven years, 
Schlumberger invested another $1 billion in capital additions and research and 
development.  While no public information on the profitability of Fairchild was 
ever released, Schlumberger accumulated for tax purposes net operating loss 
carryforward provisions of  $600 million by  1986.9 Prompted by  these deep 
losses as well as a dramatic erosion in market share (Fairchild dropped from 
number two in the world in 1975 to number fourteen in 1985), Schlumberger 
tried to sell 82 percent of Fairchild to Fujitsu in  1986. The price was  $225 
million, but Schlumberger would keep the most valuable asset: the $600 mil- 
lion in tax losses. However, in the wake of several dumping suits filed against 
Japanese producers, U.S. Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige opposed the 
sale. Five days after the secretary went public with his opposition, Fujitsu with- 
drew its bid. Six months later, Schlumberger sold all of  Fairchild to a U.S. 
company-National  Semiconductor-for  $122 million. 
Foreign and military policy considerations continued to stall foreign acqui- 
sitions of U.S.  semiconductor companies. In 1987, the United Kingdom’s Ples- 
sey sought to buy Harris Semiconductor, a manufacturer that focused almost 
exclusively  on  the  government  market,  particularly  military  applications. 
When the Pentagon threatened not to buy chips from firms owned by non-U.S. 
capital, that deal also fell through (Ziegler 1991). Harris remained independent 
and a few years later expanded its semiconductor operations by buying General 
Electric’s captive semiconductor subsidiary. 
The Fairchild-Fujitsu deal was clearly the turning point for foreign acquisi- 
tions of non-start-up companies in the United States, especially from Japanese 
suitors. Fujitsu, which had no semiconductor investment in the United States 
1982,175-6) 
9. This brief discussion of Fairchild relies on MacKenzie de Sola Pool (1988); Rukstad and 
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prior to 1986, was willing to pay a premium for Fairchild because Fairchild 
offered a strong patent position (dating back twenty years) that could give Fu- 
jitsu an entrie into new markets, especially U.S. defense markets. In addition, 
for the price of one fabrication facility, Fujitsu would have a base in the United 
States from which to expand and at least some of  Fairchild's accumulated ex- 
perience of  working in Silicon Valley.Io At a time of  excess capacity in  the 
industry, no U.S. firm could place a similar value on Fairchild's intellectual or 
physical assets. In the absence of political intervention, more such acquisitions 
might have been predicted. As discussed below,  political events of  the mid- 
1980s made locating fabrication in the United States suddenly more attractive 
for Japanese firms. However, Japanese firms seemed to have viewed the Fair- 
child incident and, to a lesser extent, the Harris decision as a signal that the 
U.S. government would prevent or forestall wholesale acquisitions of leading 
U.S. semiconductor companies. Acquisitions of  very small (usually fabless) 
semiconductors have continued (see table 7.4),  but unlike many of the earlier 
investments in  U.S.  capacity and  market  position, these  investments have 
largely been purchases of technology. 
7.4  Third Wave: New Greenfield Investment in Fabrication Facilities 
The first wave of FDI was largely outflows from the United States, driven 
by the labor intensity of semiconductor assembly and the protectionism in Eu- 
rope; the second wave  of  foreign acquisitions was  largely European firms, 
driven by  their failure to establish a successful base at home."  Throughout 
these periods, however, Japanese firms remained insignificant exporters of 
long-term capital. Prior to 1990, most large Japanese firms had assembly plants 
in Southeast Asia for very price-sensitive commodity products, but only four 
firms had fabrication plants outside of Japan, all (five fabs) in the United States 
and none in Europe. According to Dataquest, in a $60 billion worldwide mar- 
ket in 1989, Japanese companies accounted for more than 45 percent of world 
revenues but only 16 percent of the world's $6 billion in offshore production 
(Dataquest 1990). 
Three events in the mid-1980s should have stimulated a renewed interest in 
FDI by all major players. Two events were political: the US.-Japanese Semi- 
conductor Trade Agreement and Europe's  1992 program. The 1986 semicon- 
ductor trade agreement (hereafter referred to as the SCTA) was critical in entic- 
ing Japanese factories to the United States, while fears over the possibility of 
10.  At least some management could be expected to stay, since the deal with Schlumberger 
would have offered senior management an equity stake that would grow over time. 
11.  Some European firms continued to use an acquisition strategy.  Phillips had the most success 
with its U.S. acquisition of  Signetics. Philips was the only European to remain a top-ten semicon- 
ductor firm  in 1991. While it was not believed to be a very profitable operation, it continued to 
make significant investments, including a majority ownership in Taiwan Semiconductor Company 
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fortress Europe in 1992 encouraged both Japanese and U.S. companies to ex- 
pand their presence within Europe. The third event was Japanese firms taking 
leadership in certain commodity products and, more important, Japan becom- 
ing the largest market for semiconductors in the world in 1986 with many of 
the world’s leading semiconductor equipment vendors (USITC 1991). On the 
surface, FDI would have seemed more attractive, since Japan’s market was now 
officially open. Japan consumed 50 percent of  world production after 1986, 
and the SCTA sought to guarantee U.S. and other non-Japanese firms 20 per- 
cent of that market. 
The SCTA was obviously important in stimulating Japanese investment in 
the United States because of  its pricing provision. Immediately prior to the 
SCTA, the U.S. government found Japanese companies guilty of  dumping 
DRAMS and EPROMs (another type of memory), with dumping margins of 
up to 188 percent for individual Japanese suppliers. As part of the SCTA, the 
United States agreed to suspend the dumping suits in exchange for the Japa- 
nese producers agreeing not to sell their products at prices below their (aver- 
age) cost of production, plus an 8 percent profit margin, in the United States 
and third markets. The United States reserved the right to add or drop products 
from the monitoring arrangement in the future. It was anticipated that this ar- 
rangement would deter or prevent dumping of  such products in the future. 
However, products manufactured in the United States would be exempt from 
the pricing guidelines. 
Changes in European rules of  origin on semiconductors provided similar 
incentives for FDI in Europe. In 1989, the commission fundamentally altered 
the definition of  “made in EC.”I2 Prior to  1989, chips would be considered 
European if the “last substantial process or operation that is economically jus- 
tified was performed” in the EC. Assembly and test operations were counted 
as a “substantial process” under these guidelines. The new  rules, however, 
stated that fabrication of wafers or diffusion was necessary to exempt the chips 
from duty. This change also influenced the antidumping rules in the EC. In the 
past, a manufacturer could move test and assembly to the European Commu- 
nity and be exempt from possible dumping sites. Since Japanese and Korean 
firms had been frequent targets of  dumping suits in the electronics industry, 
the EC regulation was widely interpreted as an “antiscrewdriver” plant rule 
targeted at Asian producers.’3 
The combination of  these two policy  changes in Europe and the United 
States influenced a step-function change in the policies of Japanese firms to- 
ward FDI. By  1990, virtually every Japanese firm had announced plans for 
new facilities: eleven (ten of which were memory) were slated for the United 
States, and ten (eight memory) were proposed for Europe. In my  interviews 
12. Quoted from EC Regulation 802/68, article 5,  in Flamm (1990, 271). 
13. One Korean firm, Samsung, also invested in fab capacity for DRAMS in France.  Since 
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with Japanese firms, their managers argued that “in terms of costs, manage- 
ment of engineers, and the control of production, it was better to produce in 
Japan.”I4  Nonetheless, these firms decided to invest abroad. The rationale most 
frequently cited for this decision was trade friction, but there were also other 
familiar rationales such as “being close to the customer,” access to new engi- 
neering talent and technology, and access to foreign capital. Moreover, the pat- 
tern of investment by firms had striking parallels to Knickerbocker’s  hypothesis 
that  smaller companies in oligopolistic industries often follow the industry 
leader overseas (Knickerbocker 1973). In semiconductors, the largest Japanese 
producer, NEC, pioneered investment in the United States in the late 1970s 
and was the first to invest in Europe (Scotland and later West Germany). The 
other large semiconductor firms-Hitachi,  Mitsubishi, Matsushita, Toshiba, 
and Fujitsu-lagged  a decade behind NEC in the United States but only two 
to three years behind in Europe. Smaller firms (e.g., NMB) generally eschewed 
building foreign fabrication facilities. In at least two instances, Japanese firms 
did buy existing capacity: Matsushita’s production in Oregon was a small fab 
bought from National Semiconductor as part of the Fairchild acquisition, and 
Sony made a deal with AMD in the United States to have use of their fabs in 
Texas for making static RAMS. AMD, financial strapped, later sold Sony the 
capacity. The former AMD fab had forty times more capacity for SRAMs than 
Sony’s 1991 semiconductor market share in the United States. 
Few of the Japanese investments in the United States or Europe could be 
easily justified by  strictly economic criteria.ls The economics of  production 
was the driving force behind the first wave of assembly FDI in Southeast Asia; 
the desire to appropriate some of the spillovers of semiconductors was the driv- 
ing force behind the second wave of acquisitions. In this third wave, only the 
sale of  some semiconductor products, particularly application-specific inte- 
grated circuits (ASICs), could benefit from closer links between the customer 
and the manufacturing location. All of Toshiba’s U.S. operations, for instance, 
were small, “personalization” fabs that took mostly finished wafers from their 
Japanese factories and performed the final two or three (out of two hundred- 
plus) steps of  production in the United States. They were relatively small 
investments for the purpose of local customization. 
Politics was the driving force behind the vast majority of Japanese FDI in 
fabrication for memories, particularly DRAMS and SRAMs. Since these prod- 
ucts were strictly commodities with huge economies of scale and virtually zero 
transportation costs, the best location for a DRAM plant was next to the R&D 
lab. Yet  virtually all of the significant R&D for memory products of Japanese 
firms was kept at home.I6 
14. Interviews with Japanese firms, December 1989. 
15. Toshiba, for example, announced plans to build fab capacity in Europe after the change in 
regulations but  subsequently decided to  postpone it indefinitely. They announced in  1991 that 
further new capacity could not be financially justified. Interview with industry executive, 1992. 
16. It was common practice in the semiconductor industry for firms to have design centers in 
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Another important attribute of Japanese fabs in the United States was that 
they were generally not using state-of-the-art technology in 1992. In Japan, the 
newest memory fabs used eight-inch wafers and 0.5-micron line width technol- 
ogy: the most advanced Japanese fab (NEC) in the United States had six-inch 
wafers with 0.7-micron line width; the majority of the fabs averaged around 
1  .O-micron line width.” Several of the plants in the United States (not includ- 
ing NEC, Hitachi, and Fujitsu) were built and equipped for under $100 million, 
suggesting they were largely pilot operations for small-volume business. NEC, 
which entered the market in  1978, was the only Japanese firm operating at 
very high volumes. The other leading Japanese firms had not fully ramped up 
production in the United States. In Europe, by contrast, most Japanese firms 
had  committed bigger investments ($200 million-$400  million) in  capital 
for large-scale memory production with six-inch wafers at 0.8-micron line 
widths. 
There was a similar pattern, on a much smaller scale, of expanding fabrica- 
tion facilities by  U.S. companies in Europe. Since most U.S. semiconductor 
companies already had fabrication facilities in Europe, further FDI would only 
be likely if a firm needed to expand capacity for the European market. Exclud- 
ing IBM, which entered a joint venture with Siemens in France for advanced 
memories, Texas Instrument was making the largest investment, with $1.2 bil- 
lion, four-year project in Italy with heavy Italian government subsidies, includ- 
ing grants and loans. Three other U.S. firms decided to invest for the first time 
in Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s: Intel, AT&T, and Analog Devices. 
Intel and Analog Devices built fabs in Ireland; AT&T built a large semiconduc- 
tor fab in Spain. Among all U.S. semiconductor firms, only TI and IBM did 
significant R&D in Europe. 
Despite what appeared to be obvious incentives for U.S. and European man- 
ufacturers to invest in Japan in the late 1980s, the rate of  non-Japanese fab 
investment in Japan was virtually unchanged from the earlier periods. Point- 
of-sales affiliates, design centers, quality assurance and testing centers, and 
failure analysis centers expanded by more than a factor of two after the SCTA 
(Semiconductor Industry Associations 1989). None of  these facilities, how- 
ever, required significant capital investment. Prior to the SCTA, only four mer- 
chant “American” semiconductor companies (TI, Motorola, Fairchild, and LSI 
Logic) had fab or assembly facilities in Japan, but Schlumberger sold off Fair- 
child’s Japanese fabs and only TI and Motorola expanded after 1986.’* LSI 
Logic, an ASIC vendor with under $1 billion in revenue, located its first fab in 
significant portion of total R&D spending for any semiconductor firm.  Rather, a design center 
would take core products that came out of centralized R&D and adapt them for local needs. Sharp, 
for instance, built what it described as an R&D center in Washington State; however, the R&D 
was virtually all final-stage customization for the U.S. market. 
17.  Interview with industry executives, 1992. 
18. This excludes IBM and AT&T.  IBM had semiconductor facilities in Japan dating hack 
twenty years, and AT&T entered into agreements with NEC on semiconductor technology in the 
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Japan. LSI needed capital, and Kawasaki Steel, looking to diversify, was will- 
ing to underwrite most of the investment (“A new emerging species” 1991). 
Motorola entered the Japanese market after liberalization of capital controls 
in  1980. It went into a joint venture with a failing Japanese semiconductor 
company, (Aizu-Toko), which Motorola subsequently bought in 1982. After 
exiting from DRAMS  in 1985, Motorola licensed some of its key microproces- 
sor technology to Toshiba as part of a joint manufacturing in DRAMS in 1986. 
The joint venture also called for Toshiba to help Motorola with market access 
in Japan. (Motorola subsequently invested in a small fab in China in  1990 
to serve the Chinese market, as well as new assembly test facilities in Hong 
Kong.) 
TI adopted an aggressive strategy of  new FDI in fab capacity in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. While TI planned $2 billion in capital expansion, 50 
percent of that investment was to be underwritten by foreign partners. In addi- 
tion to its deal in Italy, TI planned to expand DRAM capacity in Japan, Singa- 
pore, and Taiwan. TI’S major commitment of capital in Japan was done with a 
joint venture with Kobe Steel; in Taiwan, it was done with a joint venture with 
a PC clone company, Acer Computer. The Singapore joint venture included 
Canon, Hewlett-Packard, and the Singapore Economic Development Board, 
which collectively would invest $330 million for a facility to open in 1993. 
FDI by European competitors was nonexistent in Japan in the latter half of 
the 1980s, while FDI in the United States was in a disinvestment mode: SGS- 
Thomson built a shell for a fab in the early 1980s in Phoenix but had not filled 
the building with equipment through 1992; Philips-Signetics was scaling back 
its operations, exiting from its older fab in Salt Lake City while retaining its 
plant in New Mexico; and Siemens had a very small pilot fab in Silicon Valley 
for sale. 
7.5  Some Consequences of the Recent FDI 
If  one looks at the total FDI fab capacity invested in semiconductors in Eu- 
rope, Japan, the United States, and developing countries in the 1980s, only 
U.S.  investment in Europe significantly altered the global configuration of pro- 
duction of trade. As noted earlier, only an estimated 10 percent of world pro- 
duction took place outside of national firms’ home bases by  1989 (see figure 
7.1). Production was clearly “global,” in the sense that products continued to 
be shipped to Southeast Asia for finishing and then reexported to the home and 
third countries. But by  1990, as figure 7.2 illustrates, Japanese firms had less 
than 4 percent of  the fab lines in the United States and 3 percent of Europe, 
while TI and Motorola had only 8 percent of the lines in Japan.I9 The most 
19. Fab lines are probably the most accurate measure of activities by  nonlocal producers, but 
they do not equate to share of production. The Japanese had roughly 46 percent of world produc- 
tion in 1990 but only 29 percent of  the semiconductor fab lines, because they have a narrower 
range of product offerings than do U.S. firms and larger, dedicated lines that produce higher vol- 
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Fig. 7.1  Percentage of total offshore production by regional companies 
Source: Dataquest (1990). 
Worldwide Fabrication Lines  North American Fabrication Lines 
752 lines  393 lines 
Japanese Fabrication Lines  European Fabrication Lines 
227 lines  132 lines 
Fig. 7.2  Semiconductor fabrication lines: Location and ownership by major 
market and principal producers’ share, 1990 
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Table 7.5  Total Japanese Semiconductor  Trade  ($ millions) 
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Source: Japan Electronics  Bureau, JETRO. 
aDuring the 1965-66 period, the Japanese exported only discrete semiconductor  devices (DSDs); 
these included germanium transistors, silicon transistors, germanium diodes, silicon diodes, and 
silicon diodes for silicon rectifiers.  (Thus, the data do not include integrated  circuits for this 
period.) 
the 1967-72  period, the Japanese began exporting integrated circuits (ICs). However, the data 
do no distinguish between ICs and DSDs. 
material consequence of  FDI has been felt in Europe, where U.S. firms had 25 
percent of the total fab lines in production in 1990. 
The implications of  FDI  in the 1980s and early 1990s had for trade and 
employment were relatively modest. Japanese firms continued to serve world 
markets largely through direct exports from Japan: the 10 percent decline in 
Japanese semiconductor exports in 1990 (table 7.5) was a result of collapsing 
DRAM prices, not trade substitution. Due to the limited ramping of U.S.  pro- 
duction by  Japanese fabs, Japanese imports were 82 percent higher in  1990 
than in 1986. In the meantime, the United States continued to run trade deficits 
in semiconductors, but the bulk of imports into the United States-on  the or- 217  Foreign Direct Investment in Semiconductors 
der of 65 percent to 70 percent-still  originated from the foreign subsidiaries 
of U.S. companies.2o 
7.6  Implications of FDI in Semiconductors 
There appear to be three possible anomalies in the evolving pattern of FDI 
in semiconductors. First, there,  has been a stickiness to FDI in semiconductors 
that is not purely economic in nature. Many U.S. firms invested aggressively 
in assembly and test facilities in Southeast Asia during the 1960s and 1970s. 
The impact of  these historical investments continue to weigh heavily on the 
industry in the 1990s. If the semiconductor industry had started in this decade, 
with Japanese and U.S. firms holding the same competitive positions they held 
in 1990, the structure of world production would be vastly different. The vol- 
ume of products shipped from Southeast Asia would be substantially reduced; 
direct U.S. exports would be much greater; and facilities in Ireland, Scotland, 
Israel, and various locations on the European continent might not even exist. 
Instead, most firms have, over time, expanded facilities in old locations, partic- 
ularly in Southeast Asia. For the most part, organizational inertia appears to 
be the best explanation. Remember that only the physical plant, which ac- 
counts for about 20 percent of the capital costs of an assembly/test operation, 
is sunk the equipment (80 percent of  total costs) is mobile, and in the late 
1980s and early 199Os, locating assembly and test next to the fabrication plant 
was  more  cost effective. Local  assembly  was  especially cost effective for 
higher value-added logic products, which were increasingly dominating U.S. 
companies’ product lines. 
The second anomaly that appears in the data is the location of new FDI in 
fabrication facilities. The history of domestic investment in semiconductors in 
the United States and Japan clearly exhibits a clustering phenomenon: U.S. 
fabrication and R&D facilities clustered around three locations: California’s 
Silicon Valley,  Phoenix (Motorola’s semiconductor headquarters), and Texas 
(TI’S headquarters). In Japan, a similar clustering took place in the corridor 
between Tokyo and Yokohama and around Osaka. There was less clustering in 
Europe because of  sovereign national boundaries. However, if  one looks at 
the pattern of FDI in both the United States and Europe since the mid-l980s, 
investments have been widely dispersed. In Europe, new facilities have been 
built in Ireland, Scotland, England, Spain, Germany, Italy, France and (if one 
considers Siemens’s non-German European investments) Austria (see figure 
7.3).  In the United States, Japanese FDI has gone to Washington, Oregon, and 
20.  One estimate by industry executives suggested that Japanese firms were producing roughly 
$1.5 billion worth of ICs in the United States in 1991, compared with roughly $5 billion in annual 
U.S. sales and $3.5 billion in imports. However, if the Japanese fully ramped their existing capacity 
in the United States, they could substitute more than half their exports for domestic production. 
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North Carolina, as well as to established clusters in Texas, California, Arizona, 
and New Mexico.21 
There are at least two complementary explanations for these location deci- 
sions. First, and probably most important, there has been significant competi- 
tion for FDI among states in the United States and even more intense compe- 
tition  among nations in  Europe.  Given  the  heavy  capital  intensity of  fab 
investments, a variety of benefits-direct  subsidies, interest-free loans, tax re- 
lief, free or subsidized land, and so on-provided  by local governments have 
made some locations more attractive than others for investing firms. When 
the industry was in its infancy, subsidies in many instances would not have 
outweighed the benefits of clustering. Skilled labor was in short supply, and it 
was easier to hire those workers in established clusters, where they had more 
abundant job opportunities. The availability of the necessary infrastructure for 
constructing a complicated fab and a guaranteed power supply were also criti- 
caLZ2  However, most of these inputs were available in the 1990s in many devel- 
oped countries and most U.S.  states. As a result, those specific benefits or 
positive externalities of clustering are less obvious to firms. 
Second, some managers have interpreted the leakiness of  semiconductor 
technology as a negative externality, which can be minimized by locating in 
places outside of existing clusters.23  While countries and states are explicitly 
trying to replicate the dynamism of Silicon Valley by attracting foreign capital, 
firms are trying to avoid the negative consequences of Silicon Valley: the risks 
associated with  state-of-the-art process and product technology leaking to 
competitors with facilities in the region. Building a fab in a new location does 
not guarantee that other firms will not locate there in the future, but there is a 
relatively low probability that a Spanish or Irish fab worker will end up in a 
competitor’s factory in France or Germany. If firms continue to disperse their 
foreign investment activities and limit the scope of  their foreign operations, 
the return on government subsidies for attracting FDI could be low indeed. 
There also appeared to have been differences between the locational strate- 
gies of Japanese and U.S. firms. There is no dominant choice for a location 
within Europe, because demand for products is spread broadly across many 
European nations. Nonetheless, U.S. firms were more likely to be influenced 
by the size of the subsidy than were their Japanese counterparts. The biggest 
subsidies were offered by Spain, Ireland, and Italy, which enticed AT&T, Intel, 
and TI, respectively. NEC located in Scotland (large fab) and West Germany 
(small fab), while Fujitsu located in England. Japanese managers’ greater com- 
fort with English might be part of the explanation. Both regions offered finan- 
cial  incentives, though  apparently  much  less  than  competing  10cations.~~ 
21. Intel established a fab in New Mexico in the early 1980s. 
22.  Even minor power outages can be devastating to a semiconductor fab: a momentary outage 
23. This insight came from interviews with managers of one US.  firm’s European operation. 
24.  Interview with industry executives. 
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Hitachi also opted to invest in West  Germany, despite very limited govern- 
ment support. 
A third anomaly, one difficult to explain, is the lack of significant new green- 
field FDI in Japan; also, the little FDI which has taken place is almost exclu- 
sively in the form of joint ventures, despite fourteen years of “liberalized” capi- 
tal flows. The primary driver behind FDI in Europe was the perception that, 
without a local presence, the market might become closed to  Japanese and 
U.S. companies. A similar logic might have been applied to Japan, assuming 
that one believes being located behind any external barriers creates greater 
opportunity for sales. Japan, however, should have been a much more attractive 
market for FDI than Europe. Japan being the world’s largest market for semi- 
conductors, with much of the world’s most advanced equipment suppliers, one 
might predict that non-Japanese firms would want to invest to take advantage 
of the externalities associated with local semiconductor production. 
Some traditional explanations for the lack of FDI, such as the weak market 
for corporate control, cannot explain the lack of semiconductor FDI in Japan. 
Motorola, for example, was able to buy a Japanese firm to enter the market in 
the late 1970s. In addition, there is a market for fab capacity in Japan, even 
without buying an entire firm. High land prices in Japan have also been cited 
as a deterrent to entry, but some firms (e.g., Intel) who purchased adequate 
land in Japan more than a decade ago have still opted against FDI in fabrication 
or assembly. Moreover,  joint ventures appear to be the dominant form of invest- 
ment, even for firms with experience in Japan. Since the SCTA also gave Japa- 
nese firms additional incentives to buy non-Japanese semiconductors-up  to 
20 percent of the market-there  were even greater incentives for FDI. 
Without direct government subsidies or other benefits available to foreign 
investors in Europe or the United States, managers of U.S. and European firms 
continue to believe that the externality benefits of FDI in Japan do not offset 
the cost penalties associated with recruiting high-quality labor and the general 
high cost of operations in Japan. In addition, most nowJapanese firms continue 
to have difficulty recruiting the most talented engineers and selling products to 
large Japanese groups. 
The experience of  Motorola and TI, the two companies with ten-twenty 
years of  experience in Japan, do not suggest to other U.S. competitors that 
FDI will provide positive benefits. Both companies have stated publicly their 
dissatisfaction with sales in Japan.25  When TI entered the Japanese market, it 
was the undisputed technology and market share leader in the world. Despite 
twenty-four years of  operating in Japan, TI has been unable to appropriate 
significant benefits from agglomeration: it dropped to number seven in world 
market share in  1991, with poor profitability. Motorola, number two in the 
world when it entered the Japanese market, has slipped less (to number five in 
25. Motorola’s travails are discussed in Yoffie (1987b); TI’S  public dissatisfaction with its posi- 
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1991) but has been even more vocal about its inability to penetrate Japanese 
customers, despite local manufacturing and local partners committed to ex- 
panding Motorola’s market access. 
7.7  Conclusions 
The broad pattern of  FDI in semiconductors is generally consistent with 
many of the broader global patterns we observe in FDI. As one should expect 
from macrodata, the United States was  a large net exporter of capital in the 
1960s and 1970s in this industry, while Japan became a large net exporter of 
long-term capital in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
The motivations for FDI have  also been fairly consistent with traditional 
explanations. In the early period, a search for the lowest labor costs and jump- 
ing tariff barriers dominated FDI. During the second wave of acquisitions, ef- 
forts to access the advantages of U.S. “dynamism” drove foreign investment. 
And during the most recent period, politics once again dominated the scene. 
As one U.S. manager noted, “Europe has been the most successful in black- 
mailing the world  [to force investment in the comm~nity]”;~~  but Japanese 
managers would probably suggest privately that the United States has not been 
far behind. 
Despite the very global nature of the semiconductor industry, the experience 
of  Japanese, U.S., and European FDI would not suggest that public policy 
officials would have any difficulty in answering Robert Reich’s questions of 
“Who is us?’ or “Who is them?’ The vast majority of fabrication and an even 
larger percentage of research and development for semiconductors remain at 
home.  Even  though more  nondomestic, especially Japanese, capacity will 
come on line over the next decade, the underlying economics will drive suc- 
cessful firms in semiconductors to keep R&D for core products closely cou- 
pled with advanced fabrication. Design centers will further spread around the 
world; more cross-national joint ventures to share the cost and risks of  new 
technologies will evolve. But the heavy weight of history will also keep large 
employment for assembly in Southeast Asia. 
The deeper examination of actual operations by Japanese firms in the United 
States also suggests that most FDI has been more symbolic than significant. 
The limited scale of Japanese plants, the slow ramping of production, and the 
use of second-generation technology in the United States could suggest that 
Japanese firms look at investments in the United States as options. By putting 
some capacity in place which can be fully ramped at a later date, Japanese 
firms retain flexibility to respond to possible protectionism without incurring 
the full cost penalty of large-scale non-Japanese production. At the same time, 
they reduce the incentives for protectionism in the United States, because they 
could ramp local production fairly quickly if  duties or quotas were imposed. 
26. Interview with a U.S.  manager, 1992. 222  David B.  Yoffie 
Only when the threat of  protectionism is highly credible (as it has been for 
semiconductors in Europe or for cars in the United States), will firms make 
large-scale, irreversible capital commitments. 
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Comment  S. Lael Brainard 
Given the ambiguities in the aggregate data, it is refreshing to examine some 
of the unresolved questions about foreign direct investment (FDI) in a specific 
industry, and the semiconductor industry provides a particularly rich case. Da- 
vid Yoffie analyzes the evolution of FDI in the semiconductor industry by tak- 
ing a careful look at industry data combined with anecdotal evidence from 
extensive interviews. I will restate his argument in somewhat different terms 
and then suggest issues that it raises. 
The implicit argument is that the “natural” pattern of cross-border activity 
would consist entirely of  trade flows. The economics of  the semiconductor 
industry are consistent with  each of  a few  firms establishing neighboring 
R&D and fabrication facilities (fabs) at a single location, operating at high 
volume, and exporting globally. This hypothesis is premised on  significant 
plant-level economies of scale and steep learning curves, combined with low 
transport costs. Due to considerable interfirm, intraregional spillovers and high 
R&D content, these oligopolistic firms should cluster in one or a few locations 
with a high density of engineering and scientific skills. In the early years of 
the industry, the combination of high labor intensity in the final stages of pro- 
duction and an easily separable production structure made it optimal to locate 
assembly and test facilities in areas with low labor costs. More recently, auto- 
mation has permitted colocation of  testing and assembly with fabrication in 
areas with higher labor costs. Throughout, internalization of  fabrication, as- 
sembly, and testing within a unified ownership structure has been warranted 
by considerable proprietary process technology. 
Instead of exclusive reliance on trade, Yoffie argues, there has been exten- 
sive FDI and some licensing, which he attributes primarily to trade restrictions 
in the first case and to a combination of trade and investment restrictions in the 
second. His analysis presumes a clear ranking of the modes of  cross-border 
market penetration: exporting is most profitable, followed by  direct invest- 
ment, with licensing or joint ventures the least desirable options. 
Yoffie distinguishes three phases in the evolution of FDI in the semiconduc- 
tor industry. The first, from the 1960s to the early 1970s, was characterized by 
U.S. dominance. Consistent with the natural pattern, industry leaders based in 
the United States made investments in Asia to tap into low labor costs for 
assembly and testing. They also made direct investments in the EC in response 
to tariff barriers. The activities of U.S. firms in Japan were largely confined to 
licensing, due to a combination of investment and trade restrictions. 
The second half  of  the 1970s was characterized by  a number of  foreign 
acquisitions of U.S. semiconductor firms. Yoffie describes the acquisition ac- 
tivity as defensive attempts on the part of  several European firms to boost 
flagging competitiveness. 
The third phase stretches from the late 1980s to the present. It has been 
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in the EC and by Japanese firms in the United States. Yoffie describes the EC 
investments as a response to trade barriers and changes in domestic content 
regulations, and the U.S. investments as an “option” to hedge against potential 
trade barriers. 
Cross-BorderKross-Industry  and Within-Bordermithin 
Industry Evidence 
Given the paucity of firm-level data, an evaluation of the argument comes 
down to a choice of whether it fits the mostly anecdotal evidence better than 
plausible alternatives do. The argument would be strengthened considerably 
by bringing to bear evidence on cross-border investment flows in other indus- 
tries and on within-border flows in the semiconductor industry. 
Thus, for instance, the paper would be more persuasive in discussing Japa- 
nese FDI in the United States if it were to incorporate evidence across a range 
of industries, to distinguish the features that are unique to the semiconductor 
industry. It is possible that wealth effects associated with the depreciation of 
the dollar (Froot and Stein 1991) or the Japanese land and stock price bubbles 
in the latter half of the 1980s explain Japanese investment in the U.S. semicon- 
ductor industq no less than in other industries. Indeed, the increase in FDI in 
semiconductors may have been low in comparison to other industries. 
Similarly, Robert Lawrence’s finding (chap. 4  in this volume) that there are 
implicit barriers to inward investment in Japan across a broad cross section of 
industries might lend support to Yoffie’s argument that foreign firms continue 
to encounter barriers to investment in the Japanese semiconductor industry 
despite liberalization. 
Further, a comparison of  cross-border merger and acquisition activity with 
domestic activity might shed some light on the foreign acquisitions of U.S. 
semiconductor firms in the late 1970s. Indeed, without such a comparison, it 
is difficult to dismiss a hypothesis that the acquisitions were driven by internal 
industry dynamics such as the expansion beyond start-up, or the shift to very 
large scale integration (VLS1)-rather  than declining competitiveness in Eu- 
rope. Yoffie also notes that all of the European acquisitions from this period 
subsequently failed. Again, the argument would be strengthened by comparing 
the foreign failure rate with the domestic failure rate. 
Lastly, data on the domestic configurations of semiconductor firms could be 
used to help determine whether the decentralization of production within firms 
has been forced by cross-border restrictions or is simply a natural by-product 
of  the industry’s evolution. If  barriers are the prime driver, there should be 
more dispersion of production across borders than within borders. 
The “Natural” Pattern of Trade 
The argument that trade rather than investment would prevail in the absence 
of barriers slightly begs the question of the natural pattern of trade, which in 
turn has implications for the pattern of investment. This oversight permeates 225  Foreign Direct Investment in Semiconductors 
much recent literature on FDI: although multinational  production is widely 
understood as an alternative to exporting when proximity and internalization 
advantages exist (Dunning 1988; Caves 1982),  rarely is there explicit consider- 
ation of the type of trade for which it substitutes. 
Depending on the underlying impetus for trade, different predictions for the 
pattern of investment might emerge. For instance, two distinct models based 
on differentiated goods might be appropriate for different segments of the in- 
dustry. A model based on factor proportions  (Helpman 1984; Helpman and 
Krugman 1985)  would yield predictions largely consistent with Yoffie’s expla- 
nation  of  U.S. investments in the commodity chip segment in Asia in the 
1970s. A model emphasizing a trade-off between proximity and concentration 
advantages for each stage of the business system (Brainard 1992) would pre- 
dict two-way trade in segments such as microprocessors, with two-way invest- 
ment occurring only where proximity to customers or suppliers overrides scale 
considerations. 
A third alternative is a model with an intraindustry, intranational learning 
curve, such as that used by Baldwin and Krugman (1990) in their analysis of 
the 16K RAM semiconductor segment. In this case, we might expect to see 
FDI even in the absence of trade barriers to tap into local learning.’ This might, 
for instance, explain Yoffie’s second wave. 
External Economies and the Industry Life Cycle 
A third question is applicable to the literature on high-technology industries 
generally. Yoffie’s essay shares with many others in this area a slight fuzziness 
on the question of what needs to be close to what. Specifying the nature of key 
externalities more precisely, and analyzing how they change over time, might 
explain some of the puzzles Yoffie encounters. 
There frequently is confusion as to the distinction between innovation re- 
sulting from R&D and learning curves-and  the extent to which the latter is 
plant-specific as opposed to firm-specific. Thus, for instance, the prediction 
that the optimal configuration entails a single fabrication facility is premised 
on a learning curve that is plant specific within a generation, but it is unclear 
whether learning is transferred between generations and, if so, whether such 
transfers  are possible across plants.  Similarly, the prediction  of  geographic 
concentration  is  premised  on  agglomeration  economies,  but  it  is unclear 
whether these occur in R&D or learning. If  the answer is R&D, is it more 
important to put RBD facilities close to related R&D labs, fab facilities, or 
customers? Further, the relative importance of these externalities may shift over 
time. The recent migration of  plants away from Silicon Valley may  be a re- 
sponse to changes in external economies over the product life cycle, rather than 
a contradiction of agglomeration economies. In many industries, geographic 
1.  The extent to which foreign firms can tap into “home market advantages” via direct invest- 
ment is an unresolved issue. See Porter (1990). 226  David B. Yoffie 
spillovers between firms are critical in the early stages, which are characterized 
by high rates of innovation and interfirm learning facilitated by high turnover 
and spin-off activity. As such industries mature, however, proximity to special- 
ized factors, to supplier industries, or to dense concentrations of  customers 
may increase in importance and eventually dominate,2  unless externalities be- 
tween R&D labs continue to be critical or plant investment is long lived. In the 
semiconductor industry, the latter explanation seems unlikely, since the plant 
and equipment are obsolete in three to five years.3 
Indeed, it was surprising to find no reference to vertical linkages in the dis- 
cussion of location and agglomeration patterns. There is substantial evidence 
of  vertical  externalities in  the  semiconductor industry, both  upstream  and 
downstream. The newspapers are full of  articles alleging that EC and U.S. 
semiconductor firms have been handicapped by delayed access to new equip- 
ment since Japanese companies gained dominance of the equipment market. 
There is also extensive downstream integration; it has been prevalent in Japan 
since the industry’s inception and has increased substantially in the United 
States in recent years. 
This is important for two reasons. It is possible that the seeming anomalies 
in recent fab locations are explained by changing industry economics in which 
vertical externalities increasingly dominate horizontal externalities. A compar- 
ison of the geographical configurations of vertically integrated firms with those 
of  merchant firms might shed light on whether recent location choices were 
driven by strategic considerations as opposed to barriers. It would be useful to 
examine whether there is significant colocation of upstream and downstream 
R&D, and the extent to which downstream activities are themselves dispersed 
across borders. 
Second, in line with Lawrence’s analysis (chap. 4 in this volume) of keiretsu 
ties as implicit barriers to investment in Japan, the extensive degree of vertical 
integration of Japanese semiconductor firms might help to explain the low level 
of foreign investment into the Japanese semiconductor industry. 
The Three Puzzles 
Yoffie leaves us with three puzzles; I will comment on each in turn. First, 
he notes that there is a surprising lack of  agglomeration in recent greenfield 
investments. As suggested above, it is possible that the lack of agglomeration 
in recent investments is better explained by the shift to VLSI, which has fa- 
vored vertical integration and large scale over the high turnover and interfirm 
spillovers associated with agglomeration. 
Agglomeration was never a significant factor for the Japanese semiconduc- 
2. The importance of these factors may also vary among product segments. 
3.  The rapid obsolescence is also hard to reconcile with the option interpretation of  recent 
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tor industry. Many industries are concentrated in the Tokyo-Yokohama corridor 
and Osaka; this is not unique to the semiconductor industry. Further, there is a 
sharp difference in the market structures of the Japanese and U.S. semiconduc- 
tor industries. The Japanese market has never been blessed, or afflicted, by 
the high rates of entry and exit, employee turnover, and interfirm leakage of 
technology that have characterized the U.S. market. Instead, the Japanese in- 
dustry is characterized by  stable relationships between semiconductor manu- 
facturers and suppliers, buyers, and financiers, frequently through long-term 
contracts or ownership, and is dominated by  large, diversified industrial con- 
glomerates (MIT 1989). 
Second, Yoffie notes that investments in Southeast Asia have been main- 
tained and expanded, even though the automation of  assembly and test pro- 
cesses has diminished the importance of  access to low-cost labor. However, 
over the same time period, substantial downstream production (consumer elec- 
tronics and automobiles) has shifted to this region, and the industrial infra- 
structure has expanded. It is possible that continued operation in the region is 
a sensible response to shifts in global production patterns, rather than a sign 
of inertia. 
Third, Yoffie contends that it is surprising to see little FDI into Japan despite 
liberalization of  FDI regulations and implementation of  the semiconductor 
trade agreement (SCTA). This is correct with respect to the liberalization of 
FDI and corroborates evidence in other industries, as noted above. However, 
there is no reason to expect increased fabrication investment in response to the 
SCTA. The SCTA essentially targets the U.S. share of Japanese purchases of 
semiconductors. Implementation of  the agreement would be consistent with 
rising imports from the United States by  Japan, given large-scale economies 
and low transport costs. And, as Yoffie notes, investment in activities comple- 
mentary  to  trade,  such  as  marketing, distribution, and  customization, has 
doubled. 
Policy Implications 
I conclude by  turning briefly to policy implications. If  Yoffie is correct, in 
the absence of barriers to trade, industry economics would imply domination 
by a few global players concentrated in a few geographical clusters, and there 
would be no FDI. If  we take global share as a proxy for welfare?  then the 
ranking of different policies (in the absence of retaliation) would appear to be 
(1) joint trade and investment restrictions, (2) no restrictions, and (3) trade 
restrictions alone. Clearly, this is overstated. Yet, if trade and investment barri- 
ers have as deep and lasting an effect on firm configurations as Yoffie’s analysis 
suggests, it is critical for U.S. policymakers to address barriers to both trade 
and investment in negotiations over semiconductors. 
4.  This is clearly incorrect, but it reflects the priorities articulated in policy debates. 228  David B. Yoffie 
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Discussion Summary 
Robert Feenstra began the discussion by noting that a large fraction of FDI in 
semiconductors was undertaken by multinationals in order to have manufactur- 
ing capacity inside trade walls. It would be interesting to compare the experi- 
ence of other industries where FDI occurred in response to the erection of trade 
barriers-for  instance, autos. The United States rejected local content rules 
for autos but erected trade barriers while maintaining free access for FDI. 
Feenstra asked whether these two sets of policies have similar effects. 
Someone else asked whether semiconductor FDI into low-wage areas con- 
tinued because there is still a demand for old-fashioned, labor-intensive prod- 
ucts. Why does Malaysia still attract FDI? David Yofie answered that organiza- 
tional inertia seems to explain this type of  FDI. The labor  input in these 
operations is now very small, and equipment, which constitutes 80 percent of 
the capital, can be moved. Only 20 percent of the capital is immobile plant. 
The most efficient location for testing and  assembly operations in the late 
1980s and early 1990s is next to the fabrication facility (fab). 
Kenneth Froot asked why geographic agglomerations no longer seem to be 
important. That is, why do firms put fabs in Ireland and North Carolina instead 
of  Silicon Valley? Saloner and Rotemberg have a model in which firms can 
hire workers and persuade them to make industry-specific investments in hu- 229  Foreign Direct Investment in Semiconductors 
man capital if there are other firms in the area. This model implies that semi- 
conductor firms should continue to locate in Silicon Valley. 
Lael Brainard offered another reason for agglomerations: externalities with 
suppliers. The close ties which Japanese firms have with their suppliers give 
their fabs a comparative advantage over other fabs. So why are they willing to 
locate fabs outside Japan? 
Yofie explained that fabs only employ a small number of  workers. There- 
fore, it is inexpensive to find good workers by  paying them a premium.  In 
locations outside traditional areas of semiconductor investment, these workers 
are less likely to quit to go to other fabs. Since labor turnover is very bad 
for high yields, firms have  a strong incentive to locate fabs away from their 
competitors. Yofie also argued that the benefit of  locating near suppliers has 
declined. Japanese firms are willing to forgo these benefits in order to have 
production capacity inside actual or potential trade barriers in the United States 
and Europe. 
Robert Lipsey noted that Japanese buyers of semiconductors are all in keir- 
etsu and typically buy only from other firms in the keiretsu. Thus, demand for 
the output of  merchant firms in Japan is much lower than demand for such 
output in other countries, and the advantage to foreign firms of investing in 
Japan in order to sell to the local market is less than the incentive to invest in 
other countries. 
Raymond Vernon asked if foreign firms could, by locating in Japan, establish 
better contacts with Japanese suppliers and thus obtain the latest technology. 
He also asked what Texas Instruments (TI) and IBM do? Yofie answered that 
IBM produces in Burlington for its own use throughout the world. TI has had 
great difficulty selling to Japanese customers and obtaining the latest technol- 
ogy from Japanese suppliers. 
Krishna Palepu asked why governments give subsidies to FDI in semicon- 
ductors. Yofie answered that they think there are large externalities but they 
are wrong. All they get is a little employment for local engineers, but so far no 
backward or forward linkages. In recent years, suppliers and customers of the 
semiconductor industry have not followed fabs to new locations. 
Martin Feldstein asked whether increased tax revenues will eventually be 
large enough to pay for the investment incentives. Froot noted that persuading 
the second firm to invest in an area may be cheaper and easier than attracting 
the first, since the second can steal workers from the first. 
Yofie replied that it is too soon to say whether governments will recoup their 
tax subsidies but that they probably will not. A modern fab that costs $500 
million to build and receives $150 million in investment incentives has perhaps 
forty workers. Almost all the $500 million is for imported equipment, and 
almost all the downstream work will continue to be done elsewhere. Govern- 
ments see that spillovers occurred in Silicon Valley and want to duplicate that 
experience. But this is no longer happening. Ireland and Italy are only suc- 230  David B. Yoffie 
ceeding in spending huge amounts of  money bribing firms away from each 
other. 
Richard Marston observed that Compaq’s facilities in Silicon Glen in Scot- 
land now supply most of the EC with their computers. This is an example of 
an assembly operation which took some time to follow the initial fab. Maybe 
it takes time for downstream spillovers to come. 
Feldstein  suggested that corruption could also explain why governments 
give investment incentives to semiconductor firms. 
James Hines reported that Puerto Rico gave $140,000 in tax subsidies to 
manufacturing firms for each $10,000-a-year job that was created. There was 
no measurable effect on local wages. 
Someone else observed that subsidies of lost tax revenues do not cost gov- 
ernments anything, since the multinationals would not have invested in the 
subsidizing country without the tax benefits. The lost tax revenues come from 
the country where the investment would otherwise have gone. 
Geofsrev Carliner asked if international coordination could prevent multina- 
tionals from playing one country off against another. He also asked why the 
United States does not apply countervailing duties against these types of sub- 
sidies. 